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Abstract
There are several factors that may contribute to the decision to send
a child to work, such as poverty, market imperfections and parental pref-
erences. The aim of this paper is to determine empirically the relative
importance of these diverse factors on the incidence of child labor in
rural India. In order to examine several potentially influential factors
separately, we outline a theoretical model of child labor in a peasant
household based on the model presented in Bhalotra and Heady (2003)
with modifications to allow for the child to participate in different types
of labor. We then use the theoretical model to specify and estimate an
empirical model of rural child labor participation. Our results indicate
that parental education and household income appear to play the most
important role in determining whether a child works, attends school or
is idle. Market imperfections, on the other hand, only play an important
role in determining whether the child participates in family labor.
Keywords: child labor, school attendance, market imperfections,
India
JEL Codes: J13, J21, I20
∗I am grateful for comments from Arne Bigsten, Vani Borooah, Fredrik Carlsson, Sten
Dieden, Anke Hoeﬄer, Johanna Jussila Hammes, Ethan Kaplan, Ola Olsson and John
Strauss. All remaining errors are of course my own. I gratefully acknowledge financial
support from the Wallander-Hedelius Foundation.
1 Introduction
Why do some households choose to send their children to work rather than
school? The answer to this question is not straightforward, as there are several
factors that may contribute to this decision. The aim of this paper is to
construct a theoretical model that allows for the interplay of several potential
determinants of child labor, and to test this model empirically. Identifying the
main determinants of child labor is important, as policy prescriptions intended
to eliminate child labor will only be effective if they target the root cause of
the phenomenon; otherwise, they risk doing more harm than good. Further,
if there is not one but rather several factors that contribute significantly to
child labor, then several policies may be necessary to address the issue.
In recent years, a growing number of authors have turned their attention
to the question of why children work. One line of research seeks to address this
question by applying the theory of educational demand put forth by Becker
(1991). In this case, the demand for education is based on the optimiza-
tion of the trade-off between the costs of schooling and the future returns to
schooling. If the costs outweigh the benefits, the child will not attend school.
Similarly, if the returns to child labor outweigh the costs, the family will send
the child to work. Another line of research has focused on the effects of con-
straints, incentives and agency on the incidence of child labor. The constraint
placed on the household by "subsistence poverty" has tended to receive the
most attention in the literature (Basu and Van, 1998; Basu, 2000; Bhalotra,
2004), while credit market imperfections constitute another important con-
straint on the household that may contribute to child labor (Ranjan, 1999;
Baland and Robinson, 2000; Dehejia and Gatti, 2002).1 The role of incentives
in child labor has been analyzed in the context of work taking place on the
family farm or enterprise. Land and labor market imperfections may result in
a higher marginal product of child labor if the household is not able to adjust
either its land holdings or the amount of labor employed on the family farm
or enterprise, thus increasing the opportunity cost of schooling and providing
an incentive to put one’s child to work (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Dumas,
2004). Finally, agency has been shown to have an effect on the incidence of
child labor, as parents may have heterogeneous preferences and unequal intra-
household bargaining power and may or may not act altruistically towards
1"Subsistence poverty" refers to the case where the household is unable to meet sub-
sistence consumption needs with adult labor income alone, and as such depends on the
additional income generated by child labor for survival.
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their children (Basu and Ray, 2001; Bhalotra, 2001).
In order to incorporate and examine several potentially influential fac-
tors separately, we outline a theoretical model of child labor in a peasant
household based on the model presented in Bhalotra and Heady (2003), with
modifications to allow for the child to participate in different types of labor.
This model is particularly useful when market imperfections are expected to
play a role in determining child labor force participation, as well as allowing
for the effects parental preferences and household income on child labor. The
model predicts that children will be more likely to work in households with
low levels of income, and less likely to work in households where the parents
exhibit a high preference for schooling. If land/asset and labor markets are
imperfect, land and productive assets have a substitution effect that increases
the likelihood that children participate in family work. If the credit market
is also imperfect, land and productive assets have a credit market effect that
make participation in any form of work less likely. Therefore, the predicted
effect of land and productive assets on child labor is ambiguous, and depends
on the type of work in which the child participates and whether or not market
imperfections are present.
Many theoretical models of child labor (most notably the seminal paper by
Basu and Van (1998)) assume that both adult and child laborers receive wages
from an outside employer and that the labor market functions perfectly (as the
results rely upon labor market equilibria and competitive wage setting). This
is often not the case. The labor force participation rate of children in rural
areas tends to be higher than that in urban areas, resulting in the majority of
working children being involved in agricultural work, often on the family farm
(ILO, 1996). As a result, models that focus on market wage work will only
be relevant to a minority of working children. This is important to keep in
mind, as trade sanctions are often mentioned as a means of eliminating child
labor in developing countries and bans on child labor in the export sector
are unlikely to make much of an impact on the total incidence of child labor.
The same is likely to be true of adult minimum wage legislation, which would
be of little relevance in the rural areas of most developing countries where
self-employment is pervasive (Bhalotra and Tzannatos, 2003). This suggests
that a focus on child labor in rural areas may yield important insights into
the causes of child labor.2 As a result, the focus of this paper will be on
2 Indeed, Andvig (1999) finds a weak relationship between GDP and child labor par-
ticipation rates in Africa, while the relationship between child labor participation and the
percentage of the population in rural areas is significantly positive.
2
child labor in a rural setting. Further, in contrast to several previous studies,
the model presented in this paper allows for an analysis of both family and
non-family labor.
The main predictions of the theoretical model are analyzed empirically for
children aged 7-14 using data drawn from the Human Development Profile
for India, collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research
(NCAER) in 1994. This is a household survey that is representative of the
rural population for all of India.3 Children are classified by activity based on
their main occupation, i.e. the activity they take part in for at least half the
year. While this is a very strict definition that potentially underestimates the
scope of child labor, it is also useful in many respects. One advantage is that
the children classified as working become a much more homogeneous group.
It may not be the case that children working a few hours a month are affected
by the same factors as children who have work as their main occupation.
Further, it is not obvious that all child labor is harmful or undesirable; working
on the family farm or enterprise under parental supervision for a few hours
a week, for example, may be considered beneficial to the child in terms of
socialization and skill acquisition. Child labor can be considered harmful,
however, in the case of children whose main occupation is work insofar as
working significantly hinders, and in many cases prevents, these children from
receiving an education.4
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that household income and
parental education are significant determinants of child labor. Further, mar-
ket imperfections contribute significantly to child labor, particularly in the
case of family work. Therefore, policies aimed at raising household income
may be successful in reducing child labor and increasing school attendance in
the short-run, while policies aimed at improving access to and the quality of
schooling may be more successful in the long-run.
The remainder of the paper is organized a follows. Section two outlines a
theoretical model of child labor. Descriptive statistics of child labor in rural
India by gender and land ownership are given in Section three. Section four
presents the empirical specification and discusses some estimation issues, the
3While the rate of participation in child labor in India may not be particularly high,
especially compared to sub-Saharan African countries, the absolute number of children
participating in some form of labor is substantial due to India’s large population.
4Child labor may be harmful in several other respects, especially when working conditions
are hazardous or children are mistreated by their employers. However, as the survey does
not contain information on the conditions under which children work, the only form of harm
that can be demonstrated is the deprivation of educational opportunities.
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results of which are discussed in Section five. Section six concludes the paper.
2 The theoretical model
The theoretical model developed in this section is taken from Bhalotra and
Heady (2003) with some modifications. In keeping with Bhalotra and Heady,
we specify a two period model of a peasant household, and for simplicity we
assume that each household contains one parent and one child. We maintain
the assumption that the parent always works, and that the child does not bar-
gain with its parent, i.e. the parent decides how the child’s time is allocated.5
While Bhalotra and Heady assume that households do not hire out labor,
we assume that households may hire out child labor. The parent produces
output in each period using their own labor, owned and rented land, owned
productive assets, hired labor and potentially their child’s labor as inputs.
Children who do not participate in family work in the first period may work
as wage laborers outside the family or they may attend school, but we assume
that they do not combine any of these activities. It is also possible that the
child participates in none of these activities in the first period, in which case
the child is idle.
The first period household production function is given by:
f (Ao, Ar1,Ko, Lp1, Lcf1, Lh1) (1)
where Ao and Ar are owned and rented land, Ko is owned productive capital,
Lp and Lh are parent and hired labor and Lcf is child family labor (= 0 if
the child does not participate in family work). Hired labor is not a perfect
substitute for family labor when the labor market is imperfect, just as rented
land is not a perfect substitute for owned land when the market for land is
imperfect. Further, we assume that child labor is not a perfect substitute for
adult labor.6 Therefore, each type of land and labor used to produce output
enters the production function as a distinct input. We assume that there are
decreasing marginal returns to all inputs, so that the first derivative of the
production function with respect to any of the inputs is positive, while the
5See Basu (1999) for an overview of models of child labor with intra-household bargaining.
The assumption that children do not bargain with their parents is quite reasonable, as the
only recourse a young child would have is to leave the household, which is not likely an
attractive alternative. Bhalotra and Heady point out that this option becomes even less
attractive for children who can expect to inherit the family farm.
6This is a common assumption in the literature; see Basu and Van (1998), Ranjan (2001),
for example.
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second derivative is negative. Finally, we assume that total land, total labor
and capital enter the production function multiplicatively.
In the case where the child participates in family work, first period net
household income, Y1, is a function of the household production function as
follows:
Y1 = f (Ao, Ar1,Ko, Lp1, Lcf1, Lh1)−wh1Lh1 − pr1Ar1 (2a)
whereas in the case where the child works as a wage laborer, net household
income in the first period is given by:
Y1 = f (Ao, Ar1,Ko, Lp1, Lh1) +wcw1Lcw1 −wh1Lh1 − pr1Ar1 (2b)
and in the case where the child attends school or is idle, net household income
in the first period is given by:
Y1 = f (Ao, Ar1,Ko, Lp1, Lh1)−wh1Lh1 − pr1Ar1. (2c)
In the above equations, wcw and wh are wages paid to child and hired labor
and pr is the price of rented land.
In the second period the child has become an adult and may or may not
continue to live in the family household, but it is assumed that their income
and consumption remain part of the household total. Therefore, the child’s
contribution to household income in the second period enters the income
equation separate from the household production function (which maintains
the same characteristics as in the first period in all other respects). Second
period household income is given by:
Y2 = f (Ao, Ar2,Ko, Lp2, Lh2) +wc2 (ACT1)Lc2 −wh2Lh2 − pr2Ar2 (3)
where ACT1 = Lcf1, Lcw1, S, I depending on whether the child worked, at-
tended school or was idle in the first period. Further, wc2 is not necessarily
an explicit wage; it may be the marginal product of the child’s own farm
labor, for example. Thus we assume that the child’s second period wage is
a function of the first period activity in which the child participated. This
allows for a dynamic effect for the choice of activity in the first period.
We assume that the household can either save or borrow in the first period,
so that first period consumption is not bound by first period income. Further,
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the household is assumed to inherit some initial financial wealth (which can
be either positive or negative) from period zero. First period net financial
wealth, ω1, is thus given by:
ω1 = ω0 + Y1 −X1 −C (S) (4)
where ω0 is initial financial wealth, C (S) is the direct cost of schooling (= 0
if the child does not attend school) and X1 is first period consumption (the
price of which is normalized to unity).
When the credit market is imperfect the interest rate, r, available to
the household becomes a function of wealth. Hence, second period financial
wealth is a function of both first period wealth and the interest rate. If
ω1 < 0, i.e. if the household is in debt and requires a loan, then the interest
rate will also depend on the personal characteristics of the loan-taker, Z, as
well as the amount collateral the household can supply. In the case of rural
households, collateral will most likely take the form of owned land, Ao, making
the interest rate a function of Ao, Z and ω1 when the household takes a loan.
7
Consequently, second period net financial wealth is given by:
ω2 = Y2 −X2 + ω1 (1 + r (ω1)) (5a)
when ω1 > 0, and by:
ω2 = Y2 −X2 + ω1 (1 + r (ω1, Ao;Z)) (5b)
when ω1 < 0. Simplifying this expression somewhat, we can express the
corresponding second period budget constraint as:
X2 = Y2 + ω1 (g (ω1)) (6a)
when the household saves in the first period, and as:
X2 = Y2 + ω1 (g (ω1, Ao;Z)) (6b)
when the household borrows in the first period. We will assume that
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
>
7Swain (2001) provides evidence of the important role of land ownership in credit markets
in the Puri district of Orissa in India. She finds that the amount of land owned is positively
related to access to loans. Further, when a loan is granted the amount of land owned has a
significant influence on the rate of interest paid.
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0 and
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)
< 0 when the household saves and that
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
< 0,
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)
> 0,(
∂g
∂Ao
)
< 0 and
(
∂2g
∂A2o
)
> 0 when the household borrows.
The household now endeavors to maximize its utility function, which is
assumed to be time separable and is given by:
U = U1 (X1, Lp1, ACT1) + δU2 (X2, Lp2, Lc2) (7)
where δ ≤ 1 is the inverse of the time discount factor, ρ, (i.e. δ = 1
ρ
) and
ACT1 is as defined above. The utility function is assumed to be a twice
differentiable positive concave function of consumption and leisure, so that
the marginal utility of consumption is positive while the marginal utility of
labor and schooling is negative (i.e. the marginal utility of leisure is positive).
Thus, the parent is faced with the following maximization problem:
max U subject to ω1 − ω0 − Y1 +X1 +C (S) = 0 and (8)
X2 − f (Ao, Ar2,Ko, Lp2, Lh2)−wc2 (ACT1)Lc2
+wh2Lh2 + pr2Ar2 − ω1g (ω1, Ao;Z) = 0
where Y1 is given by (2a), (2b) or (2c) above.
By setting up a Lagrangian function Γ with multipliers λ1 and λ2, we can
derive the first order conditions relevant to the child labor/schooling decision:
∂Γ
∂X1
=
(
∂U1
∂X1
)
− λ1 = 0 (9)
∂Γ
∂X2
= δ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
− λ2 = 0 (10)
∂Γ
∂ω1
=
(
ω1
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ g (ω1)
)
λ2 − λ1 = 0 (11a)
if the household saves in the first period, or
∂Γ
∂ω1
=
(
ω1
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ g (ω1, Ao;Z)
)
λ2 − λ1 = 0 (11b)
if the household borrows in the first period.
∂Γ
∂Lcf1
=
(
∂U1
∂Lcf1
)
+
(
∂f
∂Lcf1
)
λ1 + Lc2
(
∂wc2
∂Lcf1
)
λ2 ≤ 0 (12)
∂Γ
∂Lcw1
=
(
∂U1
∂Lcw1
)
+wcw1λ1 + Lc2
(
∂wc2
∂Lcw1
)
λ2 ≤ 0 (13)
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∂Γ
∂S
=
(
∂U1
∂S
)
−
(
∂C
∂S
)
λ1 + Lc2
(
∂wc2
∂S
)
λ2 ≤ 0. (14)
Equation (12) tells us that the child will participate in family labor if the
value of the marginal product of first period family labor plus the value of
the increase in the second period wage due to family work experience is equal
to the marginal disutility of family labor. The decision to send the child
to participate in wage labor hinges on (13), which states that the child will
participate in wage labor if the first period wage plus the value of the increase
in the second period wage due to wage work experience is equal to the marginal
disutility of wage labor. Finally, (14) gives the condition necessary for a parent
to send their child to school and states that the value of the increase in the
second period wage due to schooling minus the marginal cost of schooling
must be equal to the marginal disutility of schooling. These results can be
summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The maximization problem in (8) has four potentially unique so-
lutions for child activity:
ACT 1:


= Lcf1 if (12) holds with equality
and (13), (14) hold with
strict inequality.
(i)
= Lcw1 if (13) holds with equality
and (12), (14) hold with
strict inequality.
(ii)
= S if (14) holds with equality
and (12), (13) hold with
strict inequality.
(iii)
= I if (12), (13) and (14) all hold with strict inequality. (iv)
where
λ1 =
(
∂U1
∂X1
)
=Wδ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
(15)
and
λ2 = δ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
(16)
with W =
(
ω1
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ g (ω1)
)
when the household saves in the first period
and W =
(
ω1
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ g (ω1, Ao;Z)
)
when the household borrows in the first
period.
If more than one of the equations (12), (13) and (14) hold with equality,
then the parent will be indifferent between the respective activities and we are
unable to predict which activity will be chosen.
Proof. These results follow directly from the first order conditions pre-
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sented above.
From the results in Lemma 1, we can derive the following propositions:
Proposition 1 Land and productive assets have a substitution effect on the
child’s participation in family work, making participation in family work more
likely as the household’s land and productive asset holdings increase.
Proof. From (12), it is clear that the child will be more likely to partic-
ipate in family labor as ∂f
∂Lcf1
increases. It follows from (1) and our assump-
tions that land and assets enter the production function multiplicatively and
that the production function is positive and concave that as the household’s
holding of land and productive assets increase, the marginal productivity of
child family labor increases, holding all else constant. This in turn increases
the incentive to employ the child in family work.
Proposition 2 Land has an income effect that decreases the likelihood that
the child participates in any form of work and increases the likelihood that the
child attends school as land holdings increase.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 3 When the credit market is imperfect and the household bor-
rows, there is a credit market effect of holding land that makes the child less
likely to participate in any form of work and more likely to attend school as
land holdings increase.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 4 When the credit market is imperfect and the household saves,
there is a credit market effect of holding land that makes the child less likely
to participate in any form of work and more likely to attend school as land
holdings increase, when first period wealth is sufficiently large. This effect is
smaller, however, than in the case when the household borrows, and may even
be reversed if first period wealth is small.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Propositions 1 to 4 demonstrate the different effects land and productive
asset holdings can have on participation in child labor. Proposition 1 illus-
trates the substitution effect of land and productive assets on child family
work, which is the incentive aspect of the model. The substitution effect
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arises from land and labor market imperfections, i.e. the household is unable
to adjust its land holdings and the number of workers outside the family it
employs. The result is that as the household’s holding of land and produc-
tive assets increase, the marginal productivity of child family labor increases,
and the incentive to employ the child in family work becomes greater. The
substitution effect is only relevant for family work, as an increase in land and
productive asset holdings will not affect the wage received when the child
participates in wage labor and will not have a direct impact on the decision
whether or not to send the child to school.
Proposition 2 illustrates the income effect of land on child labor. While
this is related to the poverty constraint that is present in other theoretical
models, the income effect here cannot be seen as compelling poverty. The
effect of land and productive assets in this case is indirect, and works through
the production function. Households with larger land and productive asset
holdings will produce more output in both periods, and will hence have a
higher net income from which they can consume. This is turn will increase
the likelihood that the parent will be able to forgo the extra income that could
be earned by the child through either family or wage labor. Therefore, we
would expect an income effect from holding land and productive assets that
would act to lower the incidence of child labor. In the case of family labor,
the wealth effect may be partially or even wholly offset by the substitution
effect of land and productive assets, which acts to increase the incidence of
child family labor.
Propositions 3 and 4 illustrate the credit effect of holding land. When the
credit market is imperfect, the interest rate paid on loans is a negative function
of first period wealth and the amount of land held by the household. First
period wealth, in turn, is a positive function of land holdings. Therefore,
as land holdings increase, the rate of interest the household has to pay on
its loan decreases, and it becomes more likely that the household can forgo
the income that the child could earn through participating in some form of
labor. The result is that land holdings are expected to be negatively related
to child labor. When the household saves, the interest rate paid on savings is
a positive function of first period wealth. Therefore, while land holdings are
generally expected to lower the incidence of child labor, there is an incentive
to increase first period wealth, and hence increase the interest rate earned
in the first period. If this incentive is sufficiently large, the household may
actually have an incentive to send the child to work. We believe, however,
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that this scenario is improbable. Therefore, credit market imperfections are
expected to lead to a negative relationship between land holdings and child
labor.
While propositions 2 to 4 have only explicitly considered the effects of
land holdings on the child’s participation in work and school attendance, it is
straightforward to confirm that the results hold for productive asset holdings
as well. In this case, we would include the additional assumption that the
effect of asset ownership on the interest rate is identical to the effect of land
on the interest rate in the case where the household requires a loan.
Controlling for the income effect of land and productive asset holdings,
there are two opposing effects of land and asset holdings on child participation
in family work: the substitution effect and the credit market effect. If land
and assets have a positive effect on child family labor, then we can assume
that the land and labor markets are imperfect, while we cannot say anything
about the credit market. If the effect of land and assets on child family
labor is zero, then either all markets are perfect, or the effect of the land and
labor market imperfections is exactly offset by the effect of the credit market
imperfection. Finally, if land and assets have a negative effect on the child’s
participation in family work, then we can conclude that the credit market is
imperfect. Similarly, if the effect of land and assets on child non-family work
is zero, then we can assume that the credit market is perfect, while a negative
effect of land and assets indicates that the credit market is imperfect.
Proposition 5 Children will be more likely to participate in some form of
work if their parents exhibit a greater preference for child labor (i.e. if they
experience a smaller disutility of sending the child to work). Conversely,
children will be more likely to attend school if their parents exhibit a greater
preference for schooling (i.e. if they experience a smaller disutility of sending
the child to school).
Proof. From (12), (13) and (14) above, it is clear that these equations
are more likely to hold with equality as
(
∂U1
∂Lcf1
)
,
(
∂U1
∂Lcw1
)
and
(
∂U1
∂S
)
become
less negative.
Proposition 5 demonstrates the role of parental preferences in the choice of
activity in which the child will participate, and represents the agency aspect
of the model. Parental preferences will affect the relative marginal disutility of
child family labor, child wage labor and schooling. One could easily imagine
that wage labor would yield the highest level of disutility, followed by family
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labor and schooling. If parents do not value schooling at all, however, then
one would expect that schooling would yield a relatively high level of marginal
disutility. Similarly, some parents may exhibit a small distaste for child labor
if they believe that child labor has some beneficial effects on the child in terms
of socialization and experience (that does not necessarily translate directly
into higher future wages). Additionally, the degree of parental altruism will
affect the preferences for schooling versus child labor.
The cost of schooling will have an effect on whether or not the child attends
school, as can be seen from (14). Parents may choose not to send their children
to school if the marginal cost of school attendance (i.e.
(
∂C(S)
∂S
)
) is high. This
will be the case even when the parent does not have the incentive to send the
child to work (in which case the child will be idle in the first period). Further,
as the benefits of sending the child to school do not materialize until the
second period (as the child does not generate any income in the first period),
parents who have a high discount rate (i.e. small δ) will not be adequately
compensated for the marginal cost and disutility of schooling and as such will
choose not to send their children to school.
From (12), (13) and (14) it is apparent that the effect of first period child
activity on second period wages will play an important role in determining the
activity in which the child will participate. The effect of child labor/schooling
on future wages will depend on a number of factors. For example, if the child
is expected to inherit the family farm, the return to child family labor may be
much higher than the return to wage labor or even schooling. While empirical
evidence has shown that the returns to schooling are generally quite high on
an aggregate (national) level, the quality of local schools may be such that the
benefit in terms of increased future wages is negligible or even zero.8 Even if
the schools are of high quality, low demand for high skilled labor will result in
schooling having a small impact on second period wages. The same will hold
true if the child belongs to a group that is economically discriminated against
(for example women or members of minority groups), resulting in a limited
number of job opportunities for the child in the second period. Finally, while
we have not distinguished between boys and girls in the theoretical model, the
assumption that the child pools its second period income with the household
may be less likely to hold in the case of girls, further weakening the incentive
to send girls to school.
8For example, Psacharopoulos (1994) provides macroeconomic evidence that shows that
the returns to education are higher than the returns to physical capital in all parts of the
world, indicating that education should be profitable in many cases.
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3 Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this paper are drawn from the Human Development Profile
for India, collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research
(NCAER) in 1994. The sample is representative of the rural population at the
level of all India, and includes 33,229 households spread over 1,765 villages in
16 states. A child is defined in the survey as a person under the age of 15. For
the purposes of this study, we will focus on children ages 7-14, in keeping with
the definition of a child commonly used by the International Labor Organi-
zation (ILO, 2002), for example.9 Further, the survey follows the definition
of work as set out by the ILO. Children are considered economically active if
they participate in market production and paid work or if they participate in
certain unpaid non-market production, such as production of goods for own
use or work on a family operated enterprise. As such, economic activity is
not confined to the formal sector, but rather encompasses the informal sector
and illegal activities as well. Children who perform domestic chores in their
own household, however, are not considered to be economically active and are
therefore not considered to be engaged in child labor.
We have data on the primary and secondary occupational status of the
children in the sample. The primary occupation of the child is defined as
the activity that the child is engaged in for at least half the year, while the
secondary occupation of the child is any activity that the child participates
in additional to the primary occupation (Shariff, 1999). Classifying the chil-
dren according to activity is relatively straightforward. However, in the case
where the primary occupation of the child is not stated, or given as "child
under 15 years", we assign the child to the category stated as their secondary
occupation. If no secondary occupation is given, the child is considered idle.
Classifying the children based on their primary occupation is a very re-
strictive measure of child labor and, to a somewhat lesser extent, school at-
tendance. One striking feature of the data is that only about 0.5% of the
children sampled report that they combine school and work of one form or
another. The reason for this is that there are very few children who report
both a primary occupation and a secondary occupation. As a result, the
analysis will be focused on children’s participation in the activity that they
are engaged in for at least half of the year. This is a very strict definition of
9The ILO tends to focus on children between the ages of 5-14. We limit our analysis to
children 7-14, however, due to the fact that almost all children ages 5-6 are idle, with the
second largest group attending school. It is reasonable to assume that in most cases, five
and six year old children are too young for any activity other than idleness.
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child labor/school attendance that carries with it both advantages and disad-
vantages. The obvious disadvantage is that children who only work for part
of the year and attend school or are idle for the rest of the year are not in-
cluded as child laborers. It is reasonable to expect that this category of child
laborers is quite substantial. The advantage, however, is that the categories
we analyze are considerably more homogeneous than would otherwise be the
case (the exception to this case being idle children). Indeed, one could rea-
sonably expect significant difference between children who work at least half
of the year and children who work a few hours a week. This is not to say
that the latter group is not of interest; however, children in the former group
share the characteristic that they are engaging in work to the extent that
it significantly hinders, and in many cases prevents, them from receiving an
education. Further, a number of previous studies have measured child labor
based on the number of hours the child worked in the week previous to the
survey (see Bhalotra (2004), Dehejia and Gatti (2002) and ILO (1996), for
example ) These results may be sensitive to the time of the year that the
survey is carried out. Our data, on the other hand, uses an annual measure
of child labor.
We can divide children’s occupational status into four categories: student,
family worker, non-family worker, and idle. Family work includes all produc-
tive work done within the household, while non-family work refers to economic
activities that the child takes part in outside of the household, such as wage
labor. A problem arises in how we treat a fifth category of children, namely
those who list their primary occupation as "own household work", which is
defined as unpaid household work that does not contribute to household in-
come. As mentioned above, the ILO does not consider household chores and
similar non-productive activities to be work. As such, one alternative is to
include these children in the category of idle children, as they are not eco-
nomically active. However, these children may be contributing to household
income indirectly; by carrying out domestic chores, they may allow another
member of the household (the mother, for example) to participate in pro-
ductive work. Further, if the child had been carrying out the same duties in
another household, they would qualify as a domestic servant and would be
considered economically active. Therefore, we choose to assign these children
to their own category, as domestic workers.
Tables 1 and 2 contain correlation coefficients for some variables of in-
terest. Table 1 present the correlation coefficients for household size and
14
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composition, land, income and assets for the pooled sample. Household size
is strongly positively correlated to land and productive asset holdings, total
household income and the proportion of children in the household, while it
is negatively correlated with the average age of the household members and
per capita income, where the latter is simply total household income divided
by household size. Further, while the proportion of children in the house-
hold is negatively correlated with both total household income and per capita
income, the coefficient is significantly greater in the latter case.
Table 2 present the correlation coefficients for parental education and
household size and composition for the pooled sample. The correlation coeffi-
cients between mothers’ and fathers’ education seems to indicate that parents
often have similar educational levels. Higher levels of parental education is
negatively correlated with the proportion of children in the household and
positively correlated with household size.
3.1 Activity rates
In Table 3 we present the percentage of children participating in each activity
by gender and land ownership, household income and parental education,
and give the average age of children by gender and occupation. Perhaps
not surprisingly, school attendance is higher among children from households
that own land than children from those that do not. When looking at child
labor, we see that more boys are engaged in family work in the land owning
households than in the households that do not own land. The opposite is true
of the relationship between land ownership and family labor for the girls in the
sample. The percentage of children who are idle and the percentage of children
who participate in non-family and domestic work are lower in households
that own land, regardless of gender. Finally, the percentage of children who
attend school is higher in households that own land, again regardless of gender.
Therefore, when comparing land owning households with landless households,
it appears as if the wealth paradox is only relevant for boys.
Focusing solely on the differences between households that own land and
that do not own land may obscure important differences within the group of
land owning households that vary with respect to the size of land holdings.
Examining the data by farm size reveals variation in all participation rates.
The wealth paradox becomes apparent for both girls and boys in family work;
for girls there is a positive linear relationship between farm size and partici-
pation in family work, while for boys the relationship appears to be nonlinear.
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Girls’ school attendance exhibits a nonlinear relationship with farm size, while
boys’ school attendance exhibits a linear positive relationship with farm size.
Participation in non-family labor declines linearly with farm size for boys,
while it exhibits a nonlinear relationship for girls. Finally, the percentage of
children who are idle varies negatively and linearly with farm size.
School participation for both boys and girls increases with household in-
come, while participation in all other activities except family work decreases
with household income. The non-linear relationship between household in-
come and family work for both boys and girls may depend on the relationship
between land holdings and household income. Finally, an increase in parental
education has the effect of increasing school participation and decreasing par-
ticipation in all other activities for both boys and girls.
Idle children are younger, on average, than children participating in any
activity while working children are older on average than children attending
school.
3.2 School attendance in India
Article 45 of India’s constitution calls for the State to provide free and com-
pulsory schooling for all children up to age 14. This article falls within the
Directive Principles of the constitution, however, and as such is not formal law
(Sripati and Thiruvengadam, 2004). Therefore, free schooling is not always
provided, and compulsory attendance is not always enforced; both accessibil-
ity and enforcement varies from state to state.
Children typically begin primary school at age 6 and are considered to
have primary education after completing classes one through five. Classes
six through eight are taught in middle schools and are generally attended by
children aged 11-14, while secondary school pupils are typically between ages
14 and 17 and attend classes nine through twelve. Thus, all of the children
in our sample are old enough to have begun attending primary school.
4 The empirical model
From the theoretical model in section 2 above, the participation equations for
farm work, wage work, idleness and schooling can be expressed as:
ACTc1 = g (Ao, ω0, wh1, wh2, pr1, pr2, C(S);Z, e) (17)
where ACTc1 is the child’s activity in period one and e represents optimization
errors and other unobservable variables of influence. An immediate problem
18
with the above equation is that ω0 is unobservable. However, ω0 can be
written as a function of Y1, and as Y1 is observable it can be substituted
for ω0 in (17).
10 Further, we do not have information on the wages paid to
hired labor (wh1, wh2), the rental price of land (pr1, pr2) or the direct cost
of schooling (C(S)), although in the latter case we can include a proxy for
indirect costs (C ′(S)), which are discussed below.11 Taking these changes into
account, we obtain the following expression for the participation equation:
ACTc1 = g1
(
Ao, Y1,Ko, C
′(S);Z, e
)
. (18)
Due to the rather large observed differences in the participation rates
of male and female children, separate equations are estimated for boys and
girls.12 As there are potentially several observations from the same household,
the standard errors are adjusted to allow for correlation between observations
within clusters. The dependent variable consists of five unique outcomes as
defined above, with children participating in "own household work" catego-
rized as participating in domestic work. In the cases where a child both
works and attends school we will assign them to the activity they have listed
as their primary occupation.13 Due to the nature of the dependent variable,
we estimate the model using multinomial logit regression.14
The amount of land owned by the household (Ao) is measured in acres,
and we include dummy variables for different sizes of land holdings to allow
for a nonlinear relationship. The amount of land owned is typically treated as
exogenous, given that land is usually inherited and land markets tend to be
weak (Bhalotra and Heady, 2003; Swain, 2001). Leased land, however, may be
endogenous in the case of family work, i.e. a family may lease in because they
10The relationship between Y1 and ω0 may be somewhat tentative; however, substituting
household income for initial wealth is preferable to not including the variable at all, as we
wish to separate out the substitution and credit market effects of land from the income
effect.
11We do have information on the village level agriculture and non-agriculture wages for
men, women and children. We choose not to use these, however, as they are correlated with
household income, and may better reflect village level productivity than the wages paid by
an individual household to hired labor.
12Further, a likelihood ratio test performed after multinomial logit estimation rejects the
null hypothesis that boys and girls have the same likelihood ratio function.
13This is in keeping with the theoretical model, where it was assumed that children do
not combine activities. Further, it is reasonable to assume that the primary occupation is
the most relevant one for analysis.
14 If we had allowed for children to combine activities, the model would have to be esti-
mated using multinomial probit regression. In this case, however, we do not believe that
multinomial probit is appropriate, given the tiny percentage of children reported to combine
activities and the presumably large degree of measurement error of combining activities.
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have child labor readily available. Therefore, we include a dummy variable
to determine if a household leases in land. This variable is expected to have
a coefficient of zero if leased land is not endogenous, while the coefficient is
expected to be positive if it is endogenous.
The amount of owned productive capital (Ko) is measure by a weighted
index of productive assets owned by the household. Total household income,
which includes the imputed value of agricultural output, serves as our measure
of Y1. As mentioned above, we do not have any information on the direct costs
of schooling (C(S)), but we proxy this by including dummy variables which
measure whether or not a primary school is in the village, a middle school
is within 2km of the village and a high school is within 4km of the village.15
As we only have data from a single cross-section, it is not possible to include
any second period variables. Taken together, these variables constitute the
variables of importance given in (18).
Of the above variables, household income may be problematic. Indeed,
there is a risk of a simultaneity bias when children contribute to household
income either through unpaid family work or through wage labor. Therefore,
we choose to instrument household income. Household size and composition,
the primary occupation and education level of the father and mother as well as
a weighted index of non-productive assets owned by the household are used as
instruments. Further, we include village level variables such as the condition
of the road leading to the village, the distance from the village to the nearest
bus stop, the presence of a market in or within 3km of the village and the
proportion of irrigated land. State control dummies are also included.
As for child specific characteristics, we include the child’s age as a re-
gressor in the estimation. This follows from Becker’s human capital theory,
which predicts that both education and experience will increase the marginal
product of labor. While we do not have information on the number of years
of schooling the child has, we can use age as a proxy for experience. We also
include the birth order of the child among all members of the household up to
18 years of age. Further, we include a dummy variable indicating whether or
not the child is the biological child of the household head in the regression. We
include this for three reasons. The first two have to do with parental agency.
First, the household head may act more altruistically towards their own child
than towards other children in the household. As a result, we expect the chil-
15While we do have data on total expenditure on education for the households, this is
not the same as the direct cost of schooling, and is clearly highly endogenous. Hence, we
choose to utilize the indirect measures of cost of schooling mentioned above.
20
dren of the household head to be more likely to attend school and less likely
to work. However, if the household head is more likely to exert control over
the income generated by own child labor, then there is an incentive to send
own children to work.16 Finally, if the child of the household head is expected
to inherit the family land, their may be more incentive to employ the child
in family work, as the future returns to such experience may outweigh the
increase in future wages expected from schooling. Therefore, we cannot be
certain of the effect of being the child of the household head on participation
in work versus schooling.
The education level of each parent is also included as regressors in the esti-
mation. These are dummy variables measuring primary, middle and secondary
education, with the base category being illiteracy. Primary education means
that the parent is literate, but that the highest level of education attained is
primary or lower. Middle education means that the parent has attained an
educational level above primary but less than matriculation, while secondary
education includes educational attainment of matriculation and higher. The
latter two categories are combined in the case of mothers, as the low inci-
dence of mothers with secondary education or higher leads to collinearity in
the results otherwise. These variables are included as a measure of parental
preferences, as parents with higher education are expected to exhibit a greater
preference for schooling. Further, including mother’s and father’s education
separately allows for a degree of preference heterogeneity, as observed empir-
ically by Basu and Ray (2001). The same is true of including the gender of
the household head as a regressor, however this may also act as a measure of
household insecurity.
Dummy variables indicating that the child’s mother or father is absent
from the household are also included, as absent parents do not necessarily
influence the incidence of child labor to the same degree (U.S. Department
of Labor, 2000). Unfortunately, we do not have data indicating why the
parent is absent, which may play an important role in how these variables
affect child activity. For example, a parent may be absent because he or she
has migrated in order to take a job. They may, however, be absent because
they are deceased. The reason for the parent’s absence may have very different
effects on child labor and schooling. Further, the effects may be gender specific
with respect to both the missing parent and the child.
16This possible effect is supported by the theory and results presented in Basu and Ray
(2001).
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Variables measuring household composition and size are used as regressors,
with the number of females aged 15 - 59 as the comparison category. Finally,
we include two additional village level regressors: a dummy taking the value
of one if there is no anganwandi in the village and a dummy variable taking
the value of one if there is a bank or cooperative present in the village. An
anganwandi is a child care center for children under the age of six. It also
provides services to pregnant and nursing mothers. hence, this variable is
intended to capture access to child care. The second variable is intended to
provide a proxy for the household’s access to credit.
Religion and ethnicity dummies are included (but not reported) to capture
differences in preferences between these groups, but also to capture the poten-
tial effects of discrimination in the case of the scheduled tribes and scheduled
castes. Dummy variables indicating which state the household is located in
are also included as controls, and are also not reported. Table 4 reports the
summary statistics for the independent variables of interest to the analysis.
5 Results
As mentioned in section 4 above, household income is potentially endogenous
in the cases of family and non-family work. When we run our regressions in-
cluding non-instrumented log household income, we find that the variable is
negative and insignificant in the case of boys’ family work participation, while
it is positive and insignificant in the case boys’ non-family work participation.
In the girls’ regression, non-instrumented log household income is positive and
significant in the case of participation in non-family work. These results in-
dicated that household income is indeed endogenous, at least in the case of
non-family work. Therefore, we include instrumented household income as an
independent variable in our regressions through a non-simultaneous two-stage
process. The natural log of total household income is first instrumented by
means of an OLS regression on the variables listed in section 4. The predicted
values from this regression are then included as an independent variable in
the multinomial logit regressions. The standard errors of the predicted values
of household income will be smaller than would be the case with a simul-
taneous estimator, and the results must be interpreted with this in mind
(Wooldridge, 1999). Another alternative is to estimate the regressions using
instrumental probit to obtain a simultaneous estimator for household income.
This is possible in Stata; however, in this case the standard errors cannot be
adjusted for clustering by household. The results of the instrumental pro-
24
bit regressions (not reported) yield nearly identically significant household
income coefficients, indicating that the non-simultaneous method does not
introduce a significant bias.
Wald tests run for both regressions rejected the hypothesis that two or
more categories had equal coefficients on the independent variables. This
result supports our decision to separate child work into different categories.
One assumption of the multinomial logit model is that of the irrelevance of
independent alternatives (IIA). In order to test this assumption, a generalized
Hausman test is run on the regression results. The results of the test reveal
that the assumption of IIA is violated in both regressions. Specifically, the
category idle is problematic in both the boys’ and girls’ regressions, while the
category domestic work is problematic in the girls’ regression. One option
would be to use nested logit to estimate the empirical model. The disad-
vantage of this method is that it does not allow for clustering by household.
Further, attempts to use nested logit showed that the results were unstable
and often did not converge. With this in mind, we choose to rely on the
multinomial logit results.
Table 5 and table 6 present the multinomial logit estimation of boys’ and
girls’ participation in primary occupation categories, respectively.
5.1 Household income, land and productive assets
Household income has a strongly significant negative effect on participation
in all non-school activities. While this result may seem intuitively apparent
it is not self-evident, especially considering the weak relationship between
household income and child labor reported in other studies (see Bhalotra and
Tzannatos (2003) for an overview).17 A strong negative effect of household
income on work participation should not be interpreted as support for the
hypothesis of compelling poverty, however, as a negative effect rather indicates
that consumption of schooling acts as a normal good, or it may indicate a
credit constraint.18
17To further investigate whether or not log household income is endogenous, we include
the residuals from the OLS regression along with unistrumented household income as an
independent variables in the multinomial logit regression. If household income is truly
exogenous, we would expect the coefficient on the residuals to be zero (Bhalotra and Heady,
2003). For both boys and girls, however, the coefficient is positive and significant in all
cases.
18The only tests of compelling poverty that we are aware of are the ones developed and
tested by Bhalotra (2004) and Dumas (2004). Using data on children engaged in wage
labor from rural Pakistan, Bhalotra finds strong evidence supporting the hypothesis for
boys, while the hypothesis is weakly supported for girls. Dumas uses data on children
engaged in farm labor in Burkina Faso, and does not find support for the hypothesis of
25
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Table 5: Multinomial logit estimation of boys’ participation in primary occupation 
categories. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Primary occupation category 
Household income, land and 
productive assets: Idle 
Domestic 
work Family work 
Non-family 
work 
-0.7759*** -0.9488*** -0.9778*** -1.4036*** ln(household income)(+) (0.1167) (0.3487) (0.2719) (0.2152) 
-0.1843** -0.0233 0.7889*** -0.1394 Household owns landd) (0.0759) (0.1981) (0.2201) (0.1342) 
0.0274 0.0110 0.2842 -0.2837* Household owns 15 to 29 
acres of landd) (0.0888) (0.2470) (0.2139) (0.1699) 
0.1133 -0.0615 0.6282*** -0.2255 Household owns 30 to 59 
acres of landd) (0.0876) (0.2502) (0.2079) (0.1655) 
0.2245** 0.0986 0.9512*** -0.5874*** Household owns 60 or more 
acres of landd) (0.0972) (0.2467) (0.2332) (0.2153) 
0.0367 -0.1695 0.6191*** -0.2980 Household leases in land d) (0.0933) (0.2826) (0.2023) (0.2155) 
-0.2567*** -0.4445* -0.4697** -0.2158 Household owns productive 
assets d) (0.0778) (0.2404) (0.2095) (0.1656) 
-0.0148* 0.0012 0.0165 -0.0145 Index of productive assets (0.0084) (0.0248) (0.0197) (0.0201) 
    School availability: 
    
0.0959 -0.0937 0.1452 0.4101*** No primary school in village d) (0.0800) (0.2327) (0.2219) (0.1592) 
0.1202** -0.0713 -0.0712 -0.2034* No middle school w/in 2km d) (0.0605) (0.1752) (0.1590) (0.1149) 
0.0464 0.0828 -0.0056 0.0072 No high school w/in 4km d) (0.0662) (0.1952) (0.1800) (0.1282) 
    Child characteristics: 
    
-0.0770*** 0.2648*** 0.5002*** 0.4694*** Child’s age (0.0124) (0.0363) (0.0376) (0.0296) 
0.0803** -0.0336 0.0098 -0.1345* Birth order (0.0316) (0.0898) (0.0966) (0.0725) 
-0.0692 0.0356 0.2215 0.4691** Child of the household head d) (0.0806) (0.2257) (0.2238) (0.1909) 
    Parental characteristics: 
    
-0.9725*** -0.6484*** -0.7150*** -0.6887*** Father primary education d) (0.0659) (0.1716) (0.1622) (0.1204) 
-1.1739*** -0.7793** -0.5669** -0.7373*** Mother primary education d) (0.1198) (0.3147) (0.2341) (0.1946) 
-1.1349*** -1.7973*** -1.1154*** -1.2379*** Father middle educationd) (0.0944) (0.4145) (0.2657) (0.2187) 
-1.3597*** -0.9517** -1.5062*** -1.4870*** Father secondary education d) (0.1124) (0.3841) (0.4276) (0.3348) 
-0.7022*** -0.3304 -2.5149** -1.0231** Mother middle/secondary 
education d) (0.1780) (0.5505) (1.0440) (0.4375) 
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0.3265*** 0.6435** -0.0951 0.6552*** Mother absent d) (0.1261) (0.3129) (0.3072) (0.2142) 
-0.6691*** -0.8021** -0.1138 -0.5581** Father absent d) (0.1378) (0.3694) (0.3388) (0.2603) 
    Household characteristics: 
    
0.1585*** 0.2162** 0.0920 0.2143*** Household size (0.0338) (0.0889) (0.0898) (0.0666) 
0.0378 0.1787 0.0369 0.2542 Number of males 60+ (0.0749) (0.2035) (0.1905) (0.1564) 
-0.3456*** -0.3231 -0.0886 -0.3773** Number of females 60+ (0.0801) (0.1993) (0.1768) (0.1648) 
-0.2468*** -0.2283* -0.3273** -0.3508*** Number of females 15-59 (0.0554) (0.1355) (0.1326) (0.1005) 
-0.0727 0.1815 0.1286 0.1881 Number of males 0-3 (0.0592) (0.1681) (0.1678) (0.1217) 
0.0095 0.0297 0.1648 -0.1564 Number of females 0-3 (0.0589) (0.1613) (0.1624) (0.1289) 
-0.1007* -0.1255 0.1710 -0.2610** Number of males 4-6 (0.0559) (0.1533) (0.1581) (0.1194) 
-0.1494** -0.2698* 0.1738 -0.2027* Number of females 4-6 (0.0585) (0.1535) (0.1417) (0.1144) 
0.0049 -0.1166 -0.1280 0.0049 Number of males 7-14 (0.0455) (0.1213) (0.1156) (0.0927) 
-0.2093*** -0.1578 -0.1127 -0.1425* Number of females  
7-14 (0.0451) (0.1117) (0.1109) (0.0860) 
0.2949* 0.4709 0.1957 0.8541*** Female household   
head d) (0.1507) (0.3820) (0.3869) (0.2595) 
    Village characteristics: 
    
-0.1032 -0.3282 -0.2396 -0.0804 Bank/coop in village d) (0.0645) (0.2127) (0.1658) (0.1294) 
0.1504*** 0.1408 -0.1517 0.0124 
No anganwandi in village d) (0.0550) (0.1515) (0.1364) (0.1042) 
N 19318 
Pseudo-R2 0.2016 
Note: Primary occupation category ”school” is the comparison group. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by household and in parentheses. Coefficients with the superscript *** are significant at the 
1% level, **are significant at the 5% level, *are significant at the 10% level. The superscript (+) 
indicates that the variable is a non-simultaneous instrumental variable, and that the standard errors are 
not strictly accurate. The superscript d) indicates a dummy variable. Control variables for religion, 
ethnicity and state as well as an intercept are included, but the results are not reported here. 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit estimation of girls’ participation in primary occupation 
categories. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Primary occupation category 
Household income, land and 
productive assets: Idle 
Domestic 
work Family work 
Non-family 
work 
-1.3007*** -1.4405*** -1.2103*** -2.1059*** ln(household income)(+) (0.1159) (0.1583) (0.2416) (0.2648) 
-0.0586 -0.0490 -0.1313 -0.4529** Household owns landd) (0.0775) (0.1081) (0.1803) (0.1760) 
0.1697* 0.2719** 0.1648 0.1339 Household owns 15 to 29 
acres of landd) (0.0872) (0.1222) (0.2111) (0.2034) 
0.2239** 0.2971** 0.3330* -0.2229 Household owns 30 to 59 
acres of landd) (0.0877) (0.1218) (0.1983) (0.2200) 
0.3349*** 0.3493*** 0.6046*** -0.5489* Household owns 60 or more 
acres of landd) (0.0995) (0.1336) (0.2197) (0.2871) 
0.2309** 0.1923 0.4844** 0.0703 Household leases in land d) (0.0934) (0.1270) (0.2132) (0.2245) 
-0.1455* -0.3346*** -0.0161 -0.1411 Household owns productive 
assets d) (0.0803) (0.1068) (0.2041) (0.2101) 
-0.0148* 0.0233** -0.0035 0.0105 Index of productive assets (0.0081) (0.0100) (0.0249) (0.0278) 
    School availability: 
    
0.0437 0.0656 -0.0443 -0.0993 No primary school in village d) (0.0816) (0.1192) (0.2247) (0.2371) 
0.1449** -0.0266 -0.1549 -0.1429 No middle school w/in 2km d) (0.0632) (0.0861) (0.1433) (0.1432) 
0.1184* 0.1482 0.1448 0.2293 No high school w/in 4km d) (0.0701) (0.0952) (0.1608) (0.1544) 
    Child characteristics: 
    
-0.0670*** 0.4691*** 0.4248*** 0.5107*** Child’s age (0.0135) (0.0192) (0.0311) (0.0323) 
0.0501 0.0002 -0.0257 -0.1784** Birth order (0.0319) (0.0468) (0.0927) (0.0803) 
0.0166 0.1414 0.4723** 0.4461* Child of the household head d) (0.0823) (0.1210) (0.2155) (0.2344) 
    Parental characteristics: 
    
-0.7850*** -0.6048*** -0.7309*** -0.6789*** Father primary education d) (0.0633) (0.0851) (0.1361) (0.1343) 
-1.0356*** -0.8613*** -0.8847*** -0.7946*** Mother primary education d) (0.0989) (0.1376) (0.2005) (0.2220) 
-0.9904*** -0.9820*** -0.8900*** -1.5579*** Father middle educationd) (0.0894) (0.1356) (0.2087) (0.3139) 
-1.4412*** -1.1272*** -1.7944*** -1.0028*** Father secondary education d) (0.1108) (0.1637) (0.3804) (0.3662) 
-1.1486*** -1.5647*** -1.6866*** -2.2263*** Mother middle/secondary 
education d) (0.1756) (0.3039) (0.6315) (0.7245) 
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0.2037 1.0181*** 0.8144*** 0.6315** Mother absent d) (0.1349) (0.1526) (0.2701) (0.2738) 
-1.0552*** -0.6535*** -0.4157 -0.6066** Father absent d) (0.1391) (0.1781) (0.2881) (0.2907) 
    Household characteristics: 
    
0.1658*** 0.1585*** 0.0689 0.2891*** Household size (0.0351) (0.0471) (0.0820) (0.0767) 
-0.0658 -0.0580 0.0726 0.1880 Number of males 60+ (0.0773) (0.1051) (0.1822) (0.1841) 
-0.3042*** -0.1945* -0.0089 -0.5285*** Number of females 60+ (0.0781) (0.1089) (0.1806) (0.1946) 
-0.1749*** -0.1840** -0.1609 -0.3042** Number of females 15-59 (0.0545) (0.0749) (0.1204) (0.1204) 
0.0770 0.0558 0.2385* 0.0486 Number of males 0-3 (0.0604) (0.0849) (0.1412) (0.1336) 
-0.0398 0.0685 0.1610 -0.0346 Number of females 0-3 (0.0595) (0.0833) (0.1377) (0.1423) 
-0.0124 -0.0128 -0.1783 -0.1495 Number of males 4-6 (0.0549) (0.0853) (0.1447) (0.1315) 
-0.0267 -0.0334 0.1170 -0.1736 Number of females 4-6 (0.0564) (0.0821) (0.1345) (0.1454) 
-0.0368 -0.0605 -0.0333 -0.0734 Number of males 7-14 (0.0451) (0.0604) (0.1061) (0.1012) 
-0.1176** -0.0818 0.0507 -0.0237 Number of females  
7-14 (0.0463) (0.0586) (0.1053) (0.0982) 
0.0350 -0.0531 -0.1653 0.1810 Female household   
head d) (0.1607) (0.2115) (0.3366) (0.2924) 
    Village characteristics: 
    
-0.1768*** -0.0895 -0.0954 -0.1724 Bank/coop in village d) (0.0657) (0.0936) (0.1545) (0.1622) 
0.2444*** 0.1334* 0.0549 0.1753 
No anganwandi in village d) (0.0561) (0.0787) (0.1224) (0.1242) 
N 17325 
Pseudo-R2 0.2515 
Note: Primary occupation category ”school” is the comparison group. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering by household and in parentheses. Coefficients with the superscript *** are significant at the 
1% level, **are significant at the 5% level, *are significant at the 10% level. The superscript (+) 
indicates that the variable is a non-simultaneous instrumental variable, and that the standard errors are 
not strictly accurate. The superscript d) indicates a dummy variable. Control variables for religion, 
ethnicity and state as well as an intercept are included, but the results are not reported here. 
 
Turning to the land variables, we see that the wealth paradox exists for
boys participating in family work, and that the relationship between the
amount of land owned by the household and family work is positive and
nonlinear for both boys and girls. As discussed above, market imperfections
will influence the relationship between land holdings and child family labor
in two ways. If the credit market is imperfect, then increased land holdings
are expected to decrease the incidence of child family labor. The opposite is
true in the presence of land and labor market imperfections. Therefore, the
observation that land has a significantly positive effect on child participation
in family work indicates that the land and labor markets are imperfect. We
cannot conclude, however, that the credit market is perfect; it could be the
case that the effect of the credit market imperfection is overwhelmed by the
incentive created by the land and labor market imperfection.
Boys are significantly less likely to be idle in households that own land,
while the effect of owning land on participation in non-family work is signifi-
cantly negative in the case of girls. Similarly, there is a significant and negative
relationship between the amount of land owned by the household and partic-
ipation in non-family work. This may indicate a credit market imperfection,
but may also reflect income effects of land if our measure of household income
does not fully capture these effects. The relationship between the amount of
land owned by the household and child idleness is positive and nonlinear for
girls.
When the household leases in land, girls are significantly more likely to be
idle, and both boys and girls are significantly more likely to participation in
family work. This would seem to indicate that households that lease in land
do so taking into account that they can employ the child on the land. Finally,
the land variables have no effect on the participation of boys in domestic work.
Children in households that own productive assets are significantly less
likely to be idle or participate in domestic work, and boys in these households
are less likely to participate in family work. The amount of productive assets
owned is significantly negatively related to child idleness, while it is positively
and significantly related to girls’ participation in domestic work. Clearly,
productive assets do not exhibit the same effect as land on family labor. This
may be due to a smaller substitution effect of productive assets than land. If
the productive assets require more skills to operate, then child labor might not
be a viable substitute for adult labor. In this case, credit market imperfections
compelling poverty.
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may dominate.
5.2 School availability
There is a positive and significant relationship between child idleness and the
absence of a middle school within 2 km of the village, and girls are more likely
to be idle if there is no high school within 4 km of the village. The absence of
a primary school in the village is positively and significantly related to boys’
participation in non-family work, while the absence of a middle school is
negatively and significantly related to boys’ participation in non-family work.
While the first result is reasonable, the second result is counter-intuitive, and
may indicate that the distance to middle school is not a significant obstacle
to school attendance, and that this variable is capturing other village level
effects.
5.3 Child characteristics
The relationship between age and child participation in any form of work is
significant and positive, while it is significant and negative for child idleness.
These results are in line with human capital theory. Birth order is significant
in the case of idle boys and children participating in non-family work. In
the former case the relationship is positive, while in the latter it is negative.
Finally, the dummy variable indicating the child of the household head is
significant and positive for girls participating in family work and children
participating in non-family work. This may reflect that the household head
is more likely to control the income generated from the labor of their own
children rather than other children, in which case the incentive to send their
own children to work is stronger.19
5.4 Parental characteristics
The educational attainment of both fathers and mothers exhibits a signifi-
cantly negative relationship to participation in all forms of non-school activ-
ity, with the only exception being mothers with middle/secondary education
in the case of boys’ participation in domestic work. This lends support to the
hypothesis that educated parents have a stronger preference for schooling.
An absent mother is significantly and positively related to participation
in all forms of non-school activity with the exception of idle girls and boys
19This interpretation is similar to the results in Basu and Ray (2001), where preference
heterogeneity and greater inequality in relative bargaining power between parents increases
child labor.
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participating in family work, where the effect is zero. This could indicate
that child labor acts as a substitute for female labor in these cases. An
absent father is negatively related to participation in all forms of non-school
activity, but is not significant in the case of family work. This may indicate
that absent fathers are primarily migrant workers, sending money home to
facilitate their children’s school attendance.
5.5 Household characteristics
Children from larger households are more likely to participate in any form of
non-school activity, although the effect is not significant in the case family
work. This may be due to the fact that, in the case of family labor, the
marginal product of child labor is decreasing in the number of family members
employed in the family enterprise, and as such the incentive to employ children
is diminished as household size increases.
The variables measuring household composition (with the number of adult
males in the household as the base category) indicate that an increase in the
number of females in the household decreases the likelihood that the child
participates in some form of non-school activity. These results are particularly
strong in regards to the number of adult females and females over age 60
(with the exception of girls participating in family work). Therefore, children
that come from households with a high proportion of adult women are more
likely to attend school. This could indicate that female labor is a stronger
substitute for child labor, or that adult females have a higher preference for
child schooling than males.
Finally, boys from households headed by a female are significantly more
likely to be idle or participate in non-family work than to attend school.
5.6 Village characteristics
The measure intended to capture access to credit markets, the presence of a
bank or cooperative in the village, is negatively related to participation in all
non-school activity but is only significant in the case of idle girls. The coeffi-
cient on the variable measuring the absence of an anganwandi in the village
is positive and significant in the case of idle children and girls participating
in domestic work. This suggests that the availability of child care does not
affect the decision to send children to directly income-generating work rather
than school.
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5.7 Marginal effects
Table A1 and table A2 in Appendix 2 present the marginal effects from the
multinomial logit regressions on estimated probabilities for participation in
primary occupation categories for boys and girls, respectively. The results are
straightforward except in the case of income, which is in logs, and the dummy
variables. As a result, the effect of a 10% change in household income can be
read directly from the tables, while the marginal effect of a dummy variable
is for a discrete change from 0 to 1.
The results indicate that household income and parental education levels
have relatively large marginal effects on all estimated participation probabil-
ities. Further, the marginal effects of land ownership and the leasing of land
by the household are large in the case of boys’ family work participation.
The marginal effects of absent parents (particularly mothers) is large in most
cases, though less so in the case of non-family work.
5.8 Are idle children really idle?
The results presented in table 5 and table 6 indicate that many of the factors
that affect child participation in family work are also significant in the case of
idle children, particularly the amount of land owned by the household. This
may indicate that many of the children classified as idle are in fact partici-
pating in family work. In some instances, these children may be working less
than half the year (in which case family work would not be considered their
main occupation), while in others it may be a reporting error. Further, chil-
dren are significantly more likely to be idle if there is no anganwandi present
in the village, which indicates that many of these children may be taking care
of younger siblings.
The empirical analysis has not included measures of the quality or the
direct cost of schooling due to data limitations. There is evidence, however,
that parents may refrain from sending their children to school if the quality of
the school is low and/or if the direct costs of schooling are high (see Leclercq
(2001) and Drèze and Kingdon (2001), for example). When schooling is not
a viable option, it is reasonable to believe that some parents will have their
children participate in some form of work rather than do nothing at all. In
this case, it may be more likely that the children work less than half the
year, in which case work would not be considered their main occupation. The
fact that many of the children classified as idle in our sample may in fact
be working lends support to the liberal definition of child labor presented in
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Jayaraj and Subramanian (2005), where all children who are not attending
school are considered to be working.20
5.9 Previous results
Both Duraisamy (2000) and Leclercq (2002) have used the same NCAER
data set to examine child labor in rural India. Our results are not directly
comparable, however, for a number of reasons. Leclercq focuses on North
India only, and limits his sample to children aged 10-14, while Duraisamy’s
sample includes children aged 5-19. Neither author distinguishes between the
types of work that children participate in, and both use the idle category as
their comparison group. This last point may be particularly problematic, as
many of these children may in fact be working.
With these caveats in mind, both Duraisamy and Leclercq find that parental
education is a significant determinant of child labor versus schooling. Further,
both find a significant negative relationship between measures of household
income (unistrumented in Duraisamy’s case) and child labor. Leclercq finds
strong evidence that child labor, especially in the case of girls, is a substitute
for adult female work, while land (measured per capita) is only significant in
the case of girls’ school attendance. That Leclercq does not find a significant
effect of land on participation in work may depend on the fact that idle chil-
dren are the comparison group, and that he places all working children in one
category.
6 Conclusions
When looking at the factors that influence whether or not a child participates
in labor, it would appear that household income and parental education play
the largest role. Household income has a significant positive effect on school
attendance and a significant negative effect on all non-school activities, which
indicates that policies directed at raising household income should increase
school attendance. Therefore, it may be possible to increase school atten-
dance in the short- to medium-run through means of income redistribution.
However, theoretical models have shown that the results of income redistrib-
ution on school attendance are ambiguous and depend on the mean income
level of the economy (Swinnerton and Rogers, 1999; Rogers and Swinnerton,
2001; Ranjan, 2001). As a result, macroeconomic growth strategies that raise
the level of income of the entire society are likely the best long-run policies
20For our purposes, the liberal definition of child labor is impractical as we cannot mean-
ingfully allocate idle children between the different types of work analyzed in this paper.
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for reducing child labor via household income.
The relatively large negative marginal effects of parental education on all
non-school activities indicate that educated parents have a greater preference
for sending their children to school. This in turn indicates that increased
access to education may be a more effective long term means of reducing
child labor and increasing school attendance than either income or land re-
distribution. The fact that the marginal effects of mothers’ education is at
times larger than the marginal effects of fathers’ education lends further sup-
port to the idea that reducing the gender inequality in school attendance may
have significant long term results in reducing child labor and increasing school
attendance. Indeed, education appears to have a dynastic effect, where educa-
tional attainment leads to a virtuous circle, while the lack of education could
lead to a poverty trap. Therefore, policies aimed at improving the quality
and accessibility of schools may be the most successful in eliminating child
labor in the long run.
In terms of the effect of market imperfections on child labor, it would
appear that land and labor market imperfections dominate credit market
imperfections in the case of family work. This in turn has implications for
policy. One implication is that land redistribution will not necessarily work in
the same manner as income distribution with respect to child labor. There-
fore, policies aimed at improving the functioning of land and labor markets
may be desirable. Further, the results may indicate that returns to family
work experience outweigh returns to schooling, at least over a range of land
holdings. This suggests that one way to reduce child family labor is to im-
prove the quality of schools. This would also likely reduce the number of idle
children significantly. School availability seems to have the most significant
impact on idle children. Therefore, policies that aim to improve access to
schooling may not have an immediate impact on reducing child labor, as they
may instead draw children primarily from the pool of idle children. As there
are significantly more idle girls than boys, this may help to close the gender
gap. Further, as there are significantly more idle children than working chil-
dren, policies that effect idle children may have the greatest impact on school
attendance.
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Appendix 1
Proof of proposition 2. From (12) and (13) it is clear that a smaller value
of λ1 will decrease the likelihood that these equations hold with equality.
Conversely, a small value of λ1 will increase the likelihood that (14) holds
with equality. We know from (15) that λ1 = Wδ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
. Therefore, we
want to find
(
∂λ1
∂Ao
)
, holding the credit market effects of land constant. First,
substitute (2a) - (2c) and (3) into (4); then substitute (4) into (6a) or (6b).
This allows us to calculate the effect of land on X2, which in turn allows us to
calculate the effect of an increase in land on λ1. Making these substitutions,
the income effect of land can be expressed as:
(
∂λ1
∂Ao
)
=Wδ
(
∂2U2
∂X2
2
)((
∂Y2
∂Ao
)
+
(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)
g (•)
)
where W and g (•) are credit market effects that are held constant. All of
the partial derivatives in this expression are positive, with the exception of(
∂2U2
∂X2
2
)
, which is negative (this follows from our assumption that the utility
function is concave in X2). Therefore, the entire expression is negative, i.e.
an increase in land has the effect of lowering λ1.
Proof of proposition 3. From (12) and (13) it is clear that a smaller
value of λ1 will decrease the likelihood that these equations hold with equality.
Conversely, a small value of λ1 will increase the likelihood that (14) holds with
equality.
From (15) we can express λ1 as λ1 =
(
ω1
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ g (ω1, Ao;Z)
)
δ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
.
Therefore, we want to find
(
∂λ1
∂Ao
)
, holding the income effects of land constant.
As with Proposition 2, we can substitute (2a) - (2c) and (3) into (4) and then
substitute (4) into (6b). Further, we substitute (4) into our above expression
for λ1. Making these substitutions, the credit market effect of land can be
expressed as:
(
∂λ1
∂Ao
)
=Wδ
(
∂2U2
∂X2
2
)
ω1
[(
∂g
∂ω1
)(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)
+
(
∂g
∂Ao
)]
(*)
+
[
2
(
∂g
∂ω1
)(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)
+ ω1
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)
+
(
∂g
∂Ao
)]
δ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
.
When the household borrows, ω1 < 0 and the rate of interest the household
must pay on the debt is negatively related to both the size of the debt and
the amount of land the household can offer as collateral, i.e.
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
< 0 and(
∂g
∂Ao
)
< 0. Further, the interest rate paid on the loan falls more slowly as the
the size of the loan decreases, i.e.
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)
> 0. Therefore, it is clear that the
entire expression is negative, and that an increase in land holding leads to a
smaller value of λ1, thus decrease the likelihood that children from households
with large holdings of land participate in work while increasing the likelihood
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that these same children attend school.
Proof of proposition 4. As in Proposition 3 above, we are interested
in
(
∂λ1
∂Ao
)
, where λ1 can be expressed as λ1 =
(
ω1
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ g (ω1)
)
δ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
.
Again, we can substitute (2a) - (2c) and (3) into (4) and then substitute (4)
into (6a). Finally, we substitute (4) into our above expression for λ1. Making
these substitutions, the credit market effect of land can now be expressed as:
(
∂λ1
∂Ao
)
=Wδ
(
∂2U2
∂X2
2
)
ω1
[(
∂g
∂ω1
)(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)]
(**)
+
[
2
(
∂g
∂ω1
)(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)
+ ω1
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)(
∂Y1
∂Ao
)]
δ
(
∂U2
∂X2
)
When the household saves, ω1 > 0 and the rate of interest the household
receives is positively related to the amount of of wealth saved, i.e.
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
> 0
and land has no effect on the interest rate, i.e.
(
∂g
∂Ao
)
= 0. Further, the
interest rate paid on savings rises more slowly as the amount saved increases,
i.e.
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)
< 0. Clearly, the first term in (**) is negative, as
(
∂2U2
∂X2
2
)
< 0.
Further, this term is smaller than the first term in (*) by
(
∂g
∂Ao
)
. The sign of
the first term is ambiguous, and depends on whether 2
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+ω1
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)
 0.
Due to the concave nature of g (ω1), we know that 0 <
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
< 1, which in
turn implies that 2
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
< 2. Therefore, if ω1 < 2
(
∂2g
∂ω2
1
)
−1
, then the second
term of the expression is positive; otherwise, the second term is negative.
When the second term in (**) is negative, it is smaller than the second term
in (*) by 2
(
∂g
∂ω1
)
+
(
∂g
∂Ao
)
.
In the case where the second term in (**) is positive, the entire expression
will still be negative if the first term is larger than the second term.
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A1: Marginal effects after multinomial logit on estimated probabilities of 
boys’ participation in primary occupation categories. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Primary occupation category 
Household income, land and 
productive assets: Idle 
Domestic 
work 
Family 
work 
Non-family 
work 
ln(household income)(+) -0.0787 -0.0067 -0.0044 -0.0141 
Household owns landd) -0.0202 0.00002 0.0037 -0.0013 
Household owns 15 to 29 acres of 
landd) 0.0031 0.0001 0.0016 -0.0028 
Household owns 30 to 59 acres of 
landd) 0.0122 -0.0006 0.0038 -0.0025 
Household owns 60 or more acres of 
landd) 0.0248 0.0006 0.0065 -0.0057 
Household leases in land d) 0.0039 -0.0013 0.0042 -0.0029 
Household owns productive assets d) -0.0255 -0.0031 -0.0021 -0.0019 
Index of productive assets -0.0016 0.00003 0.0001 -0.0001 
    School availability: 
    
No primary school in village d) 0.0098 -0.0009 0.0007 0.0050 
No middle school w/in 2km d) 0.0133 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0023 
No high school w/in 4km d) 0.0049 0.0006 -0.0001 0.00001 
    Child characteristics: 
    
Child’s age -0.0093 0.0022 0.0025 0.0051 
Birth order 0.0087 -0.0003 0.00001 -0.0016 
Child of the household head d) -0.0082 0.0003 0.0011 0.0046 
    Parental characteristics: 
    
Father primary education d) -0.0848 -0.0038 -0.0027 -0.0055 
Mother primary education d) -0.0916 -0.0043 -0.0020 -0.0055 
Father middle educationd) -0.0865 -0.0081 -0.0036 -0.0084 
Father secondary education d) -0.1015 -0.0051 -0.0046 -0.0099 
Mother middle/secondary 
education d) -0.0585 -0.0018 -0.0058 -0.0073 
Mother absent d) 0.0363 0.0063 -0.0007 0.0087 
Father absent d) -0.0559 -0.0044 -0.0002 -0.0043 
    Household characteristics: 
    
Household size 0.0035 0.0014 0.0001 0.0027 
Number of males 60+ -0.0357 -0.0022 -0.0002 -0.0036 
Number of females 60+ -0.0252 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0034 
Number of females 15-59 -0.0082 0.0015 0.0007 0.0021 
Number of males 0-3 0.0011 0.0002 0.0008 -0.0017 
Number of females 0-3 -0.0103 -0.0009 0.0009 -0.0027 
Number of males 4-6 -0.0154 -0.0020 0.0010 -0.0020 
Number of females 4-6 0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0001 
Number of males 7-14 -0.0217 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0013 
Number of females 7-14 0.0316 0.0041 0.0007 0.0129 
 41 
Female household  head d) 0.0035 0.0014 0.0001 0.0027 
    Village characteristics: 
    
Bank/coop in village d) -0.0102 -0.0023 -0.0011 -0.0007 
No anganwandi in village d) 0.0158 0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0001 
Note: The superscript d) indicates a dummy variable, and in these cases the marginal effect is for a 
discrete change from 0 to 1. The marginal effects are calculated at the mean of each variable for each 
regression. 
 
 
 
Table A2: Marginal effects after multinomial logit on estimated probabilities of 
girls’ participation in primary occupation categories. 
 
 
Dependent variable: Primary occupation category 
Household income, land and 
productive assets: Idle 
Domestic 
work 
Family 
work 
Non-family 
work 
ln(household income)(+) -0.1713 -0.0576 -0.0101 -0.0143 
Household owns landd) -0.0072 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0038 
Household owns 15 to 29 acres of 
landd) 0.0222 0.0126 0.0014 0.0007 
Household owns 30 to 59 acres of 
landd) 0.0305 0.0133 0.0034 -0.0021 
Household owns 60 or more acres of 
landd) 0.0473 0.0148 0.0071 -0.0043 
Household leases in land d) 0.0323 0.0072 0.0059 0.0001 
Household owns productive assets d) -0.0179 -0.0146 0.0003 -0.0008 
Index of productive assets -0.0024 0.0013 0.00002 0.0001 
    School availability: 
    
No primary school in village d) 0.0061 0.0030 -0.0006 -0.0008 
No middle school w/in 2km d) 0.0224 -0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0013 
No high school w/in 4km d) 0.0155 0.0062 0.0013 0.0017 
    Child characteristics: 
    
Child’s age -0.0158 0.0234 0.0047 0.0040 
Birth order 0.0076 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0015 
Child of the household head d) -0.0003 0.0062 0.0047 0.0031 
    Parental characteristics: 
    
Father primary education d) -0.0957 -0.0207 -0.0058 -0.0037 
Mother primary education d) -0.1149 -0.0281 -0.0064 -0.0040 
Father middle educationd) -0.1073 -0.0313 -0.0063 -0.0071 
Father secondary education d) -0.1460 -0.0344 -0.0114 -0.0047 
Mother middle/secondary 
education d) -0.1158 -0.0431 -0.0101 -0.0083 
Mother absent d) 0.0116 0.0711 0.0109 0.0050 
Father absent d) -0.1103 -0.0206 -0.0026 -0.0029 
    Household characteristics: 
    
Household size 0.0222 0.0061 0.0003 0.0020 
Number of males 60+ -0.0095 -0.0024 0.0010 0.0016 
 42 
Number of females 60+ -0.0419 -0.0066 0.0007 -0.0037 
Number of females 15-59 -0.0231 -0.0073 -0.0013 -0.0021 
Number of males 0-3 0.0102 0.0019 0.0025 0.0002 
Number of females 0-3 -0.0067 0.0037 0.0019 -0.0003 
Number of males 4-6 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0012 
Number of females 4-6 -0.0036 -0.0014 0.0014 -0.0013 
Number of males 7-14 -0.0046 -0.0026 -0.0003 -0.0005 
Number of females 7-14 -0.0165 -0.0030 0.0009 0.00001 
Female household  head d) 0.0057 -0.0029 -0.0018 0.0016 
    Village characteristics: 
    
Bank/coop in village d) -0.0238 -0.0027 -0.0007 -0.0010 
No anganwandi in village d) 0.0342 0.0042 0.00003 0.0010 
Note: The superscript d) indicates a dummy variable, and in these cases the marginal effect is for a 
discrete change from 0 to 1. The marginal effects are calculated at the mean of each variable for each 
regression. 
 
